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ABSTRACT
Speculative execution is a crucial cornerstone to the performance
of modern processors. During speculative execution, the proces-
sor may perform operations the program usually would not per-
form.While the architectural eﬀects and results of such operations
are discarded if the speculative execution is aborted, microarchi-
tectural side eﬀects may remain. The recently published Spectre
attacks exploit these side eﬀects to read memory contents of other
programs. However, Spectre attacks require some form of local
code execution on the target system. Hence, systems where an at-
tacker cannot run any code at all were, until now, thought to be
safe.
In this paper, we present NetSpectre, a generic remote Spectre
variant 1 attack. For this purpose, we demonstrate the ﬁrst access-
driven remote Evict+Reload cache attack over network, leaking
15 bits per hour. Beyond retroﬁtting existing attacks to a network
scenario, we also demonstrate the ﬁrst Spectre attack which does
not use a cache covert channel. Instead, we present a novel high-
performance AVX-based covert channel that we use in our cache-
free Spectre attack. We show that in particular remote Spectre at-
tacks perform signiﬁcantly better with the AVX-based covert chan-
nel, leaking 60 bits per hour from the target system. We veriﬁed
that our NetSpectre attacks work in local-area networks as well as
between virtual machines in the Google cloud.
NetSpectre marks a paradigm shift from local attacks, to remote
attacks, exposing amuchwider range and larger number of devices
to Spectre attacks. Spectre attacks now must also be considered
on devices which do not run any potentially attacker-controlled
code at all. We show that especially in this remote scenario, at-
tacks based on weaker gadgets which do not leak actual data, are
still very powerful to break address-space layout randomization
remotely. Several of the Spectre gadgets we discuss are more ver-
satile than anticipated. In particular, value-thresholding is a tech-
nique we devise, which leaks a secret value without the typical bit
selection mechanisms. We outline challenges for future research
on Spectre attacks and Spectre mitigations.
Responsible Disclosure. We disclosed our results to Intel
on March 20th, 2018 and agreed on a disclosure date in late
July 2018.
1 INTRODUCTION
Modern computers are highly optimized for performance. How-
ever, these optimizations typically have side eﬀects. Side-channel
attacks observe these side eﬀects and consequently deduce in-
formation which would usually not be accessible to the attacker.
Software-based side-channel attacks are particularly unsettling
since they do not require physical access to the device. Many of
these attacks fall into the category of microarchitectural attacks,
which exploit diﬀerences in the timing or the behavior, which are
caused by microarchitectural elements.
Over the past 20 years, software-based microarchitectural at-
tacks have evolved from theoretical attacks [49] on implementa-
tions of cryptographic algorithms [64], to more generic practical
attacks [30, 79], and most recently to high potential threats [48, 55]
breaking the fundamental memory and process isolation. Spec-
tre [48] is a microarchitectural attack, tricking another program
into speculatively executing an instruction sequence which leaves
microarchitectural side eﬀects. These side eﬀects, in the case of all
Spectre attacks demonstrated so far [15, 48, 58, 75], are timing dif-
ferences caused by the pollution of data caches, i.e., a traditional
cache covert channel [56, 60].
Speculative execution, which is used in Spectre attacks, is a cru-
cial cornerstone to the performance of modern processors. The
branch prediction unit in modern processors makes an educated
guess about which branch is taken and the processor then specu-
latively executes the expected instruction sequence following the
predicted direction of the branch. By manipulating the branch pre-
diction, Spectre tricks a target process into performing a sequence
of memory accesses which leak secrets from chosen virtual mem-
ory locations to the attacker. This completely breaks conﬁdential-
ity and renders virtually all security mechanisms on an aﬀected
system ineﬀective. Spectre variant 1 is the Spectre variant which
aﬀects the largest number of devices, mostly associated with mis-
speculation following bound checks. A code fragment performing
ﬁrst an operation such as a bound check and subsequently an op-
eration with a microarchitectural side eﬀect is called a “Spectre
gadget”.
Spectre attacks have so far been demonstrated in JavaScript [48]
and in native code [15, 48, 58, 75], but it is likely that any envi-
ronment allowing suﬃciently accurate timing measurements and
some form of code execution enables these attacks. Attacks on In-
tel SGX enclaves showed that enclaves are also vulnerable to Spec-
tre attacks [15]. However, there are billions of devices which never
run any attacker-controlled code, i.e., no JavaScript, no native code,
and no other form of code execution on the target system. Until
now, these systems were believed to be safe against such attacks.
In fact, vendors are convinced that these systems are still safe and
recommended to not take any action on these devices [42].
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In this paper,we present NetSpectre, a new attack based on Spec-
tre variant 1, requiring no attacker-controlled code on the target
device, thus aﬀecting billions of devices. Similar to a local Spectre
attack, our remote attack requires the presence of a Spectre gad-
get in the code of the target. We show that systems containing the
required Spectre gadgets in an exposed network interface or API
can be attackedwith our generic remote Spectre attack, allowing to
read arbitrary memory over the network. The attacker only sends
a series of crafted requests to the victim and measures the response
time to leak a secret value from the victim’s memory.
We show that memory access latency, in general, can be re-
ﬂected in the latency of network requests. Hence, we demonstrate
that it is possible for an attacker to distinguish cache hits and
misses on speciﬁc cache lines remotely, by measuring and aver-
aging over a larger number of measurements. Based on this, we
implemented the ﬁrst access-driven remote cache attack, a re-
mote variant of Evict+Reload called Thrash+Reload. Our remote
Thrash+Reload attack is a signiﬁcant leap forward from previous
remote cache timing attacks on cryptographic algorithms [1, 5, 11,
16, 46, 82]. We facilitate this technique to retroﬁt existing Spectre
attacks to our network-based scenario. This NetSpectre variant is
able to leak 15 bits per hour from a vulnerable target system.
By utilizing a previously unknown side channel based on the
execution time of AVX2 instructions, we also demonstrate the ﬁrst
Spectre attack which does not rely on a cache covert channel at all.
Our AVX-based covert channel achieves a native code performance
of 125 bytes per second at an error rate of 0.58%. By using this
covert channel in our NetSpectre attack instead of the cache covert
channel, we achieve higher performance. Since cache eviction is
not necessary anymore, we increase the speed of leaking to 60 bits
per hour from the target system in a local-area network. In the
Google cloud, we can leak around 3 bits per hour from another
independent virtual machine.
We demonstrate that using previously ignored gadgets allows
breaking address-space layout randomization in a remote attack.
Address-space layout randomization (ASLR) is a defense mecha-
nism deployed on most systems today, randomizing virtually all
addresses. An attacker with local code execution can easily bypass
ASLR since ASLR mostly aims at defending against remote attacks
but not local attacks. Hence, many weaker gadgets for Spectre at-
tacks were ignored so far, since they do not allow leaking actual
data, but only address information. However, moving to a remote
attack scenario, these weaker gadgets become very powerful.
Spectre gadgets can be more versatile than anticipated in previ-
ous work. This not only becomes apparent with the weaker gad-
gets we use in our remote ASLR break but even more so with
the value-thresholding technique we propose. Value-thresholding
does not use the typical bit selection and memory reference
mechanics as seen in previous Spectre attacks. Instead, value-
thresholding exploits information leakage in comparisons directly,
by using a divide-and-conquer approach similar to a binary search.
NetSpectre marks a paradigm shift from local attacks to remote
attacks. This signiﬁcantly broadens the range and increases the
number of aﬀected devices. In particular, Spectre attacks must also
be considered a threat to the security of devices which do not run
any untrusted attacker-controlled code. This shows that counter-
measures must also be applied to these devices, which were previ-
ously thought to be safe. We propose a new alternative to Retpo-
lines [77] which has a clearer structure. Future research on Spec-
tre attacks and Spectre mitigations faces a series of challenges that
we outline. These challenges indicate that the current defenses can
only be temporary solutions since they only ﬁx symptoms without
addressing the root cause of the problem.
Contributions. The contributions of this work are:
(1) We present NetSpectre, a generic remote Spectre variant
1 attack. For this purpose, we demonstrate the ﬁrst access-
driven remote cache attack (Evict+Reload) over network,
as a building block of NetSpectre.
(2) We demonstrate the ﬁrst Spectre attack which does
not utilize the cache. Instead, we present a new high-
performance AVX-based covert channel which signiﬁ-
cantly improves the performance of remote Spectre at-
tacks.
(3) We show that even weaker forms of local Spectre attacks,
which are incapable of leaking actual data, are still very
powerful in remote Spectre attacks enabling remote ASLR
breaks without any code execution on the device.
(4) We show that Spectre gadgets can be more versatile than
anticipated. Our technique value-thresholding allows ob-
taining a secret value without the typical bit selection and
memory reference mechanics.
Outline. The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In
Section 2, we provide background on speculative execution and
microarchitectural attacks. In Section 3, we provide an overview
of the full NetSpectre attack. In Section 4, we show how to build
remote microarchitectural covert channels for use in NetSpectre
attacks. In Section 5, we show how the building blocks are com-
bined to extract memory contents over the network. In Section 6,
we evaluate the performance of our attack. In Section 7, we dis-
cuss countermeasures against local and network-based Spectre at-
tacks and outline challenges for future research. We conclude in
Section 8.
2 BACKGROUND
In this section, we discuss out-of-order execution and a subset
of out-of-order execution called speculative execution. We detail
branch prediction, a building block of most speculative execution
implementations. Finally, we will discuss known microarchitec-
tural side-channel attacks as well as SIMD instructions as a better
alternative for our use case.
2.1 Out-of-order and Speculative Execution
Modern processors do not strictly execute one instruction after an-
other. Instead, modern processors have multiple execution units
operating in parallel. The serial instruction stream is distributed
over these execution units, leaving fewer processor resources un-
used. To retain the architecturally deﬁned execution order, the pro-
cessor has a so-called reorder buﬀer, which buﬀers operations un-
til they are ready to be retired (made visible on the architectural
NetSpectre Online, July 2018,
level) in the order deﬁned by the instruction stream. Hence, out-of-
order execution lets the processor precompute the results and ef-
fects of instructions. Like simple pipeline processors, out-of-order
processors suﬀer from interrupts, since any precomputed results
and eﬀects have to be discarded. However, this is restricted to the
architecturally visible state, and diﬀerences in the microarchitec-
tural state may occur. Instructions which get precomputed but not
retired are called transient instructions [48, 55].
Out-of-order execution on modern processors can typically run
several hundred simple instructions ahead of the architecturally
visible state. The actual number depends on the speciﬁc instruc-
tions and the size of the reorder buﬀer on the speciﬁc processor.
The instruction stream of almost every complex software is not
purely linear but contains (conditional) branches. Consequently,
the processor often does not know which direction of the branch
to follow ahead of time, i.e., which subsequent instructions to run
out of order. In such cases, the processor uses prediction mecha-
nisms to speculatively execute instructions along one of the paths.
Hence, speculative execution is a strict subset of out-of-order execu-
tion. Correct predictions improve the performance and eﬃciency
of the processor. Incorrect predictions require discarding any pre-
computed results and eﬀects after the misprediction.
2.2 Branch Prediction
Branch prediction is themost commonpredictionmechanism caus-
ing speculative execution. Naturally, the performance and eﬃ-
ciency increase with the quality of the prediction. Therefore, mod-
ern processors incorporate a number of branch prediction mecha-
nisms.
Intel [39] processors have prediction mechanisms for “Di-
rect Calls and Jumps”, “Indirect Calls and Jumps”, and “Condi-
tional Branches”. These prediction mechanisms are implemented
in diﬀerent processor components, e.g., the Branch Target Buﬀer
(BTB) [18, 53], the Branch History Buﬀer (BHB) [12], and the Re-
turn Stack Buﬀer (RSB) [20]. These buﬀers may be used in con-
junction to obtain a good prediction [20]. Since branch-prediction
logic is typically not shared across physical cores [22], the proces-
sor only learns from previous branches on the same core.
2.3 Microarchitectural Attacks
Most microarchitectural optimizations depend on the processed
data or its location. As a consequence, observing the eﬀect of an
optimization (e.g., faster execution time) leaks information, e.g.,
about the data or its location.
Traditionally, microarchitectural attacks were split into two cat-
egories: side-channel attacks, which are non-destructive (passive),
and fault attacks, which are destructive (active). Side-channel at-
tacks are often used to build covert channels, i.e., a communication
between two colluding parties through a side channel.
Microarchitectural side-channel attacks were ﬁrst explored for
attacks on cryptographic algorithms [31, 49, 64, 68, 76]. More re-
cently, generic practical attack techniques were developed and
used against a wide range of attack targets, e.g., Flush+Reload [30,
31, 79].
Microarchitectural attacks are usually considered software-
based attacks, as opposed to traditional side-channel attacks and
fault attacks requiring physical access to the device. The most
prominent example of a microarchitectural fault attack is Rowham-
mer, a hardware ﬂaw in modernDRAM. Rowhammer enables mod-
iﬁcation of privileged DRAMmemory locations by an unprivileged
attacker.
Meltdown [55] and Spectre [48] are two recent microarchitec-
tural attacks. They both use covert channels to transmit secrets,
but the attacks themselves are no side-channel attacks. Since they
are non-destructive, they appear to fall in neither of the two cate-
gories.
Meltdown [55] is a vulnerability present in many modern pro-
cessors. It is the basis of a series of attacks, which all bypass the
isolation provided by the user_accessible page-table bit (set to
zero for kernel pages), e.g., diﬀerent attacks on KASLR [28, 35, 45]
thatwere discovered independently beforeMeltdown [55]. The full
Meltdown attack allows reading arbitrary kernel memory [55].
Spectre attacks [48] exploit speculative execution, which is
present in most modern processors. Hence, they do not rely on any
vulnerability, but solely on optimizations. Through manipulation
of the branch prediction mechanisms, an attacker lures a victim
process into executing attacker-chosen code gadgets. This enables
the attacker to establish a covert channel from the speculative ex-
ecution in the victim process to a receiver process under attacker
control.
2.4 Cache Attacks
The largest group of microarchitectural attacks are cache attacks.
Cache attacks exploit timing diﬀerences introduced by small mem-
ory buﬀers, called caches. These CPU caches hide memory access
latencies by buﬀering frequently used data in small but fast in-
processor memories. Modern CPUs have multiple cache levels that
are either private per core or shared across cores.
Cache side-channel attacks were the ﬁrst microarchitectural at-
tacks. Diﬀerent cache attack techniques have been proposed in the
past, including Evict+Time [64], Prime+Probe [64, 68], and Flush+
Reload [79]. Variations of these attacks are for instance Evict+
Reload [30, 54], and Flush+Flush [29]. Flush+Reload attacks and its
variants work on a cache-line granularity, as they rely on shared
memory. Any cache line in shared memory will be a shared cache
line in the inclusive last-level cache. In a Flush+Reload attack, the
attacker constantly ﬂushes a targeted memory location and mea-
sures the time it takes to reload the data. If the reload time is low,
the attacker learns that another process has loaded the cache line
into the cache. Various Flush+Reload attacks have been demon-
strated, e.g., attacks on cryptographic algorithms [10, 44, 79], web
server function calls [81], speciﬁc system activity [80], user in-
put [30, 54, 73], and kernel addressing information [28]. Prime+
Probe follows a similar principle, but only has a cache-set granu-
larity. It works by occupying memory addresses and measuring
when they are evicted from the cache. Hence, Prime+Probe at-
tacks do not require any shared memory. Various Prime+Probe
attacks have been demonstrated, e.g., attacks on cryptographic al-
gorithms [43, 56, 64, 68], user input [54, 73], and kernel addressing
information [35].
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Cache timing side channels have also been demonstrated in re-
mote timing attacks. Bernstein [11] proposed a remote timing at-
tack against a weak implementation of the AES algorithm. The
underlying timing diﬀerence was introduced from internal colli-
sions in the algorithm and corresponding to that, a varying num-
ber of cache misses during AES computations. Subsequently, sev-
eral works were published improving and reproducing this at-
tack [1, 5, 46, 82].
A special use case of a side-channel attack is a covert channel.
Here, the attacker controls both, the part that induces the side ef-
fect, and the part that measures the side eﬀect. This can be used
to leak information from one security domain to another while
bypassing any boundaries existing on the architectural level or
above. Both Prime+Probe and Flush+Reload have been used in
high-performance covert channels [29, 56, 61]. Meltdown [55] and
Spectre [48] internally use a covert channel to transmit data from
the transient execution to a persistent state.
2.5 SIMD Instructions
SIMD (single instructionmultiple data) instructions allow perform-
ing an operation in parallel on multiple data values. SIMD instruc-
tions are available as instruction set extensions on a wide range
of modern processors, e.g., the Intel MMX extension [36–38, 67],
the AMD 3DNow! extension [3, 63], and the ARM VFP and NEON
extensions [2, 7, 8]. On Intel, some of the SIMD instructions are pro-
cessed by a dedicated SIMD unit within the processor core. How-
ever, to avoid wasting energy, the SIMD unit is turned oﬀ when
it is not used. Consequently, to execute such SIMD instructions,
the SIMD unit is ﬁrst powered up, introducing a small latency on
the ﬁrst few SIMD instructions [20]. Liu [57] mentioned that some
SIMD instructions can be used to improve bus-contention covert
channels since they enable a more direct access the memory bus.
However, so far, SIMD streaming instructions have not yet been
used for pure SIMD covert channels or side-channel attacks.
2.6 Advanced Persistent Threats
The ever-increasing complexity in modern hardware and software
is also reﬂected in modern malware. Especially targeted malware
like Stuxnet [51], Duqu [9], or Flame [50], has proven to be ex-
tremely diﬃcult to detect. Consequently, it can persist on a tar-
get system or network over periods of weeks or months. Hence,
such malware is also known as “advanced persistent threats”
(APTs) [74]. In this scenario, also slow covert channels that trans-
mit a few bits to bytes per day, e.g., air-gap covert channels [32, 33],
are highly practical, since they may run over a very long time.
APTs are usually a combination of a set of concrete exploits, by-
passing diﬀerent security mechanisms to achieve an overall goal.
2.7 Address-Space Layout Randomization
One security mechanism present in modern operating systems is
address-space layout randomization (ASLR) [66]. It randomizes the
locations of objects or regions in memory, e.g., heap objects and
stacks, so that an attacker cannot predict correct addresses. Natu-
rally, this is a probabilistic approach, but it provides a signiﬁcant
gain in security in practice. ASLR especially aims at mitigating
control-ﬂow-hijacking attacks, but it also makes other remote at-
tacks diﬃcult where the attacker has to provide a speciﬁc address.
3 ATTACK OVERVIEW
In this section, we overview the NetSpectre attack based on a sim-
ple example. The building blocks of a NetSpectre attack are two
NetSpectre gadgets: a leak gadget, and a transmit gadget. We dis-
cuss the roles of these gadgets, which allow an attacker to perform
a Spectre attack without any local code execution or access. We
discuss NetSpectre gadgets in detail, based on their type (leak or
transmit) and the microarchitectural element they use (e.g., cache).
Spectre attacks induce a victim to speculatively perform opera-
tions that would not occur during strictly serialized in-order pro-
cessing of the program’s instructions, and which leak a victim’s
conﬁdential information via a covert channel to an attacker. Spec-
tre variant 1 induces speculative execution in the victim by mis-
training a conditional branch, e.g., a bounds check. Spectre vari-
ant 2 induces speculative execution in the victim by maliciously
injecting addresses into the branch-target buﬀer. Although our at-
tack can utilize any Spectre variant, we focus on Spectre variant 1
as it is the most widespread. Moreover, according to Intel, in con-
trast to Meltdown and Spectre variant 2, variant 1 will not be ﬁxed
in hardware for the upcoming CPU generation [41].
Before the actual condition is known, the CPU predicts themost
likely outcome of the condition and then continues with the cor-
responding code path. There are several reasons why the result of
the condition is not known at the time of evaluation, e.g., a cache
miss on parts of the condition, complex dependencies which are
not yet satisﬁed, or a bottleneck in a required execution unit. By
hiding these latencies, speculative execution leads to faster overall
execution if the condition was predicted correctly. Intermediate re-
sults of a wrongly predicted condition are simply not committed to
the architectural state, and the eﬀective performance is similar as
if the processor would never have performed any speculative exe-
cution. However, any modiﬁcations of the microarchitectural state
that occurred during speculative execution, such as the cache state,
are not reverted.
As our NetSpectre attack is mounted over the network, the vic-
tim device requires a network interface an attacker can reach. The
attacker must be able to send a large number of network packets
to the victim. However, these do not necessarily have to be within
a short time frame. Furthermore, the content of the packets in our
attack is not required to be attacker-controlled.
In contrast to local Spectre attacks, our NetSpectre attack is
not split into two phases. Instead, the attacker constantly per-
forms operations to mistrain the processor, which will make it con-
stantly run into exploitably erroneous speculative execution. Net-
Spectre does not mistrain across process boundaries, but instead
trains in-place by passing valid and invalid values alternatingly
to the exposed interface, e.g., valid and invalid network packets.
For our NetSpectre attack, the attacker requires two Spectre gad-
gets, which are executed if a network packet is received: a leak gad-
get, and a transmit gadget. The leak gadget accesses a bit stream at
an attacker-controlled index, and changes somemicroarchitectural
state depending on the state of the accessed bit. The transmit gad-
get performs an arbitrary operationwhere the runtime depends on
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the microarchitectural state modiﬁed by the leak gadget. Hidden in
a signiﬁcant amount of noise, the attacker can observe this timing
diﬀerence in the network packet response time. Spectre gadgets
are commonly found in modern network drivers, network stacks,
and network service implementation.
To illustrate the working principle of our NetSpectre attack, we
consider a basic example similar to the original Spectre variant 1
example [48] in an adapted scenario: the code in Listing 1 is part of
a function that is executed when a network packet is received. We
assume that x is attacker-controlled, e.g., a ﬁeld in a packet header
or an index for some API. This code forms our leak gadget.
if (x < bitstream_length)
if(bitstream[x])
flag = true
Listing 1: The conditional branch is part of a function
executed when a network packet is processed.
The code fragment begins with a bound check on x, a best prac-
tice when developing secure software. In particular, this check
prevents the processor from reading sensitive memory outside of
bitstream. Otherwise, an out-of-bounds input x could trigger an
exception or could cause the processor to access sensitive memory
by supplying x = (address of a secret bit to read) − (base address
of bitstream).
To exploit the microarchitectural state change during specula-
tive execution in a remote attack, the attacker has to adapt the
original Spectre attack. The attacker can remotely induce specula-
tive execution as follows:
(1) The attacker sends multiple network packets such that the
attacker-chosen value of x is always in bounds. This trains
the branch predictor, increasing the chance that the branch
predictor predicts the outcome of the comparison as true.
(2) The attacker sends a packet where x is out of bounds, such
that bitstream[x] is a secret bit in the target’s memory.
(3) Based on recent branch results of the condition, the branch
predictor assumes the bounds check to be true, and the
memory access is speculatively executed.
While changes in the architectural state are not committed after
the correct result of the condition is resolved, changes in the mi-
croarchitectural state are not reverted. In the code in Listing 1 this
means, that although the value of flag does not change, the cache
state of flag does change. Only if the secret bit at bitstream[x]
is set, flag is cached.
The transmit gadget is much simpler, as it only has to use flag
in an arbitrary operation. Consequently, the execution time of the
gadget will depend on the cache state of flag. In the most simple
case, the transmit gadget simply returns the value of flag, which
is set by the leak gadget. As the architectural state of flag (i.e., its
value) does not change for out-of-bounds x, it does not leak secret
information. However, the response time of the transmit gadget
depends on the microarchitectural state of flag (i.e., whether it is
cached), which does leak a secret bit.
To complete the attack, the attacker measures the response time
for every secret bit to leak. As the diﬀerence in the response time
is in the range of nanoseconds, the attacker needs to average over
0 1 0 1 0 0 0
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Figure 1: The interaction of the NetSpectre gadget types.
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Figure 2: Depending on the gadget location, the attacker has
access to either the memory of the entire corresponding ap-
plication or the entire kernel memory, typically including
the entire systemmemory.
a large number of measurements to obtain the secret value with
acceptable conﬁdence. Indeed, our experiments show that the dif-
ference in the microarchitectural state becomes visible when per-
forming a large number of measurements. Hence, an attacker can
ﬁrst measure the two corner cases (i.e., cached and uncached) and
afterward, to extract a real secret bit, perform as many measure-
ments as necessary to distinguish which case it is with suﬃcient
conﬁdence, e.g., using a threshold or a Bayes classiﬁer.
We refer to the two gadgets, the leak gadget and the transmit
gadget, as NetSpectre gadgets. Running a NetSpectre gadget may re-
quire sending more than one packet. Furthermore, the leak gadget
and transmit gadget may be reachable via diﬀerent independent in-
terfaces, i.e., both interfaces must be accessible for the attacker. Fig-
ure 1 illustrates the two types of gadgets, which will be described
in more detail later in this section.
3.1 Gadget location
The set of attack targets depends on the location of the NetSpectre
gadgets. As illustrated in Figure 2, on a high level, there are two
diﬀerent gadget locations: gadgets are either located in the user
space or in the kernel space.
3.1.1 Aacks on the Kernel. The network driver is usually im-
plemented in the kernel of the operating system, either as a ﬁxed
component or as a kernel module. In either case, kernel code is
executed when a network packet is received. If any kernel code
processed during the handling of the network packet contains a
NetSpectre gadget, i.e., an attacker-controlled part of the packet is
used as an index to reference a bit, a NetSpectre attack is possible.
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An attack on the kernel code is particularly powerful, as the ker-
nel does not only have the kernel memory mapped but typically
also the entire physical memory. On Linux and macOS, the physi-
cal memory can be accessed via the direct-physical map, i.e., every
physical memory location is accessible via a predeﬁned virtual ad-
dress in the kernel address space. Windows does not use a direct-
physical map but maintains memory pools, which typically also
map a large fraction of the physical memory. Thus, a NetSpectre
attack leveraging a NetSpectre gadget in the kernel can in general
leak an arbitrary bit stored in memory.
3.1.2 Aacks on the User Space. Usually, network packets are
not only handled by the kernel but are also passed on to a
user-space application which processes the content of the packet.
Hence, not only the kernel but also user-space applications can
contain NetSpectre gadgets. In fact, all code paths that are executed
when a network packet arrives are candidates to look for NetSpec-
tre gadgets. This does includes code both on the server side and the
client side.
An advantage in attacking user-space applications is the signiﬁ-
cantly larger attack surface, as many applications process network
packets. Especially on servers, there are an abundance of services
processing user-controlled network packets, e.g., web servers, FTP
servers, or SSH daemons. But also, a remote server can attack a
client machine, e.g., via web sockets, or SSH connections. In con-
trast to attacks on the kernel space, which in general can leak any
data stored in the system memory, attacks on a user-space applica-
tion can only leak secrets of the attacked application.
Such application-speciﬁc secrets include secrets of the applica-
tion itself, e.g., credentials and keys. Thus, a NetSpectre attack
leveraging a NetSpectre gadget in an application can access arbi-
trary data processed by the application. Furthermore, if the victim
is a multi-user application, e.g., a web server, it also contains se-
crets of multiple users. Especially for popular websites, this can
easily aﬀect thousands or millions of users.
3.2 Gadget type
We now discuss the diﬀerent NetSpectre gadgets, namely the leak
gadget to encode a secret bit into a microarchitectural state, and
the transmit gadget to transfer the microarchitectural state to a
remote attacker.
3.2.1 Leak Gadget. The ﬁrst type of gadget, the leak gadget,
leaks secret data by changing a microarchitectural state depending
on the value of a memory location that would not be accessible di-
rectly through any interface accessible to the attacker. Note that
this state change happens on the victim device, and is not directly
observable over the network.
A leak gadget gadget can leak a single bit, or even one or mul-
tiple bytes. Single-bit gadgets are the most versatile, as storing a
one-bit (binary) state can be accomplished with many microarchi-
tectural states, as only two cases have to be distinguished (cf. Sec-
tion 4). Kocher et al. [48] leaked the secret data with a byte-wise
gadget. This simpliﬁes the access to the secret data, as only byte in-
dices have to be used, but complicates the recovery process, as 256
states have to be distinguished. With local Spectre attacks, the re-
covery process is implemented by the attacker, and thus a complex
recovery process does not have any drawbacks but a slightly lower
performance. The reason is that a larger number of side-channel
tests (e.g., more Flush+Reload tests) have to be performed on the
receiving side of the covert channel. Lipp et al. [55] showed that
a transmission from out-of-order execution with single-bit covert
channel can be signiﬁcantly faster than a byte-wise or multi-byte
covert channel in a similar attack. NetSpectre attacks have to rely
on gadgets for the recovery process, slowing down the transmis-
sion signiﬁcantly. A single-bit gadget does not only have several
microarchitectural elements to choose from, but the data is also
comparably easy to recover, and the data transmission is faster
since fewer remote side-channel tests have to be performed for
the covert channel transmission. Thus, we focus on single-bit leak
gadgets in this paper. Single-bit leak gadgets can be as simple as
shown in Listing 1. In this example, a value (flag) is cached if the
bit at the attacker-chosen location is set. If the bit is not set, the
cache state of the variable remains unchanged, i.e., if it was previ-
ously uncached, it will not be cached. Hence, the attacker can use
this gadget to leak secret bits into the microarchitectural state.
3.2.2 Transmit Gadget. In contrast to Spectre, NetSpectre re-
quires an additional gadget to transmit the leaked information to
the attacker. As the attacker does not control any code on the vic-
tim device, the recovery process, i.e., converting the microarchitec-
tural state back into an architectural state, cannot be implemented
by the attacker. Furthermore, the architectural state can usually
not be accessed via the network and thus, it would not even help
if the gadget converts a microarchitectural into an architectural
state.
From the attacker’s perspective, the microarchitectural state
must become visible over the network. This may not only happen
directly via the content of a network packet but also via side ef-
fects. And indeed, the microarchitectural state will in some cases
become visible to the attacker, e.g., in the form of the response time.
We refer to a code fragment which exposes the microarchitectural
state to a network-based attacker and which can be triggered by an
attacker, as a transmit gadget. Naturally, the transmit gadget has to
be located on the victim device. With a transmit gadget, the mea-
surement of the microarchitectural state happens on a remote ma-
chine but exposes themicroarchitectural over a network-reachable
interface.
In the original Spectre attack, Flush+Reload is used to transfer
the microarchitectural state to an architectural state, which is then
read by the attacker to leak the secret. The ideal case would be
if such a Flush+Reload gadget is available on the victim, and the
architectural state can be observed over the network. However, as
it is unlikely to locate an exploitable Flush+Reload gadget on the
victim and access the architectural state, regular Spectre gadgets
cannot simply be retroﬁtted to mount a NetSpectre attack.
In themost direct case, themicroarchitectural state becomes vis-
ible for a remote attacker, through the latency of a network packet.
A simple transmit gadget for the leak gadget shown in Listing 1
just accesses the variable flag. The response time of the network
packet depends on the cache state of the variable, i.e., if the variable
was accessed, the response takes less time. Generally, an attacker
can observe changes in the microarchitectural state if such diﬀer-
ences are measurable via the network.
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Figure 3: Measuring the response time of a simple transmit
gadget, that accesses a certain variable. Only by performing
a large number of measurements, the diﬀerence in the re-
sponse timings depending on the cache state of the variable
becomes visible. The average values of the two distributions
are shown as dashed vertical lines.
4 REMOTE MICROARCHITECTURAL
COVERT CHANNELS
As described in the last section, a cornerstone of our NetSpectre
attack is building a microarchitectural covert channel that exposes
information to a remote attacker. Since in our scenario, the attacker
cannot run any code on the target system, we assume the trans-
mission happens through a transmit gadget whose execution can
be triggered by the attacker. In this section, we demonstrate the
ﬁrst remote access-driven cache attack, Thrash+Reload, a variant
of Evict+Reload. We show that with this remote cache attack, an
attacker can build a covert channel from the speculative execution
on the target device to a remote receiving end on the attacker’s
machine. Furthermore, we also present a previously unknown mi-
croarchitectural covert channel based on AVX2 instructions. We
show that this covert channel can be used in NetSpectre attacks,
yielding even higher transmission rates than the remote cache
covert channel.
4.1 Remote Cache Covert Channel
Kocher et al. [48] leverage the cache as the microarchitectural el-
ement to encode the leaked data. This allows using well-known
cache side-channel attacks, such as Flush+Reload [79] or Prime+
Probe [64, 68] to deduce the microarchitectural state and thus the
encoded data.
However, not only caches keep microarchitectural states which
can be made visible on the architectural level. Methods to extract
the microarchitectural state from elements such as DRAM [69],
BTB [18], or RSB [13] are known. Generally, the receiver of ev-
ery microarchitectural covert channel [22] can be used to transfer
a microarchitectural state to an architectural state.
Mounting a Spectre attack by leveraging the cache has three
main advantages: there are powerful methods to make the cache
state visible, many operations modify the cache state and are thus
visible in the cache, and the timing diﬀerence between a cache
hit and cache miss is comparably large. Flush+Reload is usually
considered the most ﬁne-grained and accurate cache attack, with
almost zero noise [22, 29, 79]. If Flush+Reload is not applicable
in a certain scenario, Prime+Probe is considered the next best
choice [61, 72]. Consequently, all Spectre attacks published so far
use either Flush+Reload [15, 48] or Prime+Probe [75].
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Figure 4: The probability that a speciﬁc variable is evicted
from the victim’s last-level cache by downloading a ﬁle from
the victim (Intel i5-6200U). The larger the downloaded ﬁle,
the higher the probability that the variable is evicted.
To build our ﬁrst NetSpectre attack, we need to adapt local cache
covert channel techniques. Instead of measuring the memory ac-
cess time directly, we measure the response time of a network
request which uses the corresponding memory location. Conse-
quently, the response time will be inﬂuenced by the cache state
of the variable used for the attack. The diﬀerence in the response
time due to the cache state will be in the range of nanoseconds
since memory accesses are comparably fast.
The network latency is subject to many factors, leading to noisy
results. However, the inﬂuence of noise can be decreased by averag-
ing over a large amount of network packets [1, 5, 11, 46, 82]. Hence,
an attacker needs to average over a large number of measurements
to obtain the secret value with acceptable conﬁdence.
Figure 3 shows that the diﬀerence in themicroarchitectural state
is indeed visible when performing a large number of measure-
ments. The average values of the two distributions are illustrated
as dashed vertical lines. An attacker can either use a classiﬁer on
the measured values, or ﬁrst measure the two corner cases (cached
and uncached) to get a threshold for the real measurements.
Still, as the measurement destroy the cache state, i.e., the vari-
able is always cached after the ﬁrst measurement, the attacker re-
quires a method to evict (or ﬂush) the variable from the cache. As
it is unlikely that the victim provides an interface to ﬂush or evict
a variable directly, the attacker cannot use well-known cache at-
tacks but has to resort to more crude methods. Instead of the tar-
geted eviction in Evict+Reload, we simply evict the entire last-level
cache by thrashing the cache, similar as Maurice et al. [60]. Hence,
we call this technique Thrash+Reload. To thrash the entire cache
without code execution, we again have to use an interface accessi-
ble via the network. In the simplest form, any packet sent from the
victim to the attacker, e.g., a ﬁle download, has the chance to evict
the variable from the cache.
Figure 4 shows the probability of evicting a speciﬁc variable (i.e.,
the flag variable) from the last-level cache by requesting a ﬁle
from the victim. The victim is running on an Intel i5-6200U with
3MB last-level cache. Downloading a ﬁle with 590 kilobytes is al-
ready suﬃcient to evict the variable with a probability of ≥ 99%.
With a mechanism to distinguish cache hits and misses, as well
as a mechanism to throw things out of the cache, we have all
building blocks required for a cache side-channel attack or a cache
covert channel. Thrash+Reload combines both mechanisms over a
network interface, forming the ﬁrst remote cache covert channel.
In our experiments on a local-area network, we achieve a transmis-
sion rate of up to 4 bit per minute, with an error rate of < 0.1%.
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Figure 5: Diﬀerences in the execution time for AVX2 instruc-
tions (Intel i5-6200U). If the AVX2 unit is inactive (powered
down), executing a 256-bit instruction takes on average 366
cycles longer than on an active AVX2 unit. The average val-
ues are shown as dashed vertical lines.
This is signiﬁcantly slower than cache covert channels in a local
native environment, e.g., the most similar attack (Evict+Reload)
achieves a performance of 13.6 kb/s with an error rate of 3.79%.
In this paper, we use our remote cache covert channel for re-
mote Spectre attacks. However, remote cache covert channels and
especially remote cache side-channel attacks are an interesting ob-
ject of study. Many attacks that were presented previously would
be devastating if mounted over a network interface [25, 30, 79].
4.2 Remote AVX-based Covert Channel
To demonstrate the ﬁrst Spectre variant which does not rely on the
cache as the microarchitectural element, we require a covert chan-
nel which allows transmitting information from speculative execu-
tion to an architectural state. Thus, we build a novel covert channel
based on timing diﬀerences in AVX2 instructions. This covert chan-
nel has a low error rate and high performance, and it allows for a
signiﬁcant performance improvement in our NetSpectre attack as
compared to the remote cache covert channel.
To save power, the CPU can power down the upper half of the
AVX2 unit which is used to perform operations on 256-bit registers.
The upper half of the unit is powered up as soon as an instruction
is executed which uses 256-bit values [62]. If the unit is not used
for more than 1ms, it is powered down again [19].
Performing a 256-bit operation when the upper half is powered
down incurs a signiﬁcant performance penalty. For example, we
measured the execution (including measurement overhead) of a
simple bit-wise AND of two 256-bit registers (VPAND) on an Intel
i5-6200U (cf. Figure 5). If the upper half is active, the operation
takes on average 210 cycles, whereas if the upper half is powered
down (i.e., it is inactive), the operation takes on average 576 cy-
cles, resulting in a diﬀerence of 366 cycles. The diﬀerence is even
larger than the diﬀerence between cache hits and misses, which is
only 160 cycles on the same system. Hence, the timing diﬀerence in
AVX2 instructions is better for remote microarchitectural attacks
than the timing diﬀerence between cache hits and misses.
Similarly to the cache, reading the latency of an AVX2 instruc-
tion also destroys the encoded information. An attacker therefore
requires a method to reset the AVX2 unit, i.e., power down the up-
per half. In contrast to the cache, this is signiﬁcantly easier, as the
upper half of the AVX2 unit is automatically powered down after
1ms of inactivity. Thus, an attacker only has to wait at least 1ms
before the next measurement.
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Figure 6: The number of cycles it takes to execute the VPAND
instruction (including measurement overhead) after not us-
ing the AVX2 unit. After approximately 0.5ms, the upper
half of the AVX2 unit starts to power down, which increases
the latency for subsequentAVX2 instructions. After approx-
imately 1ms, it is fully powered down, and we see the max-
imum latency for subsequent AVX2 instructions.
if (x < bitstream_length)
if(bitstream[x])
_mm256_instruction();
Listing 2: An AVX2 NetSpectre gadget which encodes a bit
using a 256-bit instruction.
Figure 6 shows the execution time of a 256-bit AVX2 instruction
(speciﬁcally VPAND) after inactivity of the AVX2 unit. If the inactiv-
ity is shorter than 0.5ms, i.e., the last AVX2 instruction was exe-
cuted not more than 0.5ms ago, there is no performance penalty
when executing an AVX2 instruction which uses the upper half of
theAVX2 unit. After that, theAVX2 unit begins powering down, in-
creasing the execution time for any subsequent AVX2 instruction,
since the unit has to be powered up again and only emulates AVX2
in the meantime [19]. The AVX2 unit is fully powered down after
approximately 1ms, leading to the highest performance penalty if
any AVX2 instruction is executed in this state.
A leak gadget leveraging AVX2 is similar to a leak gadget lever-
aging the cache. Listing 2 shows an example (pseudo-)code of an
AVX2 leak gadget. The _mm256_instruction represents an arbi-
trary 256-bit AVX2 instruction, e.g., _mm256_and_si256. If the ref-
erenced bit x in the bit stream bitstream is set, the instruction is
executed, and as a consequence, the upper half of the AVX2 unit
is powered on. This is also true if the branch-prediction outcome
was not correct and the AVX2 instruction is accessed during spec-
ulative execution. Note that there is no data dependency between
the AVX2 instruction and either the bit stream or the index. Only
the informationwhether an AVX2 instructionwas executed is used
to transmit the secret bit through the covert channel.
The transmit gadget is again similar to the transmit gadget for
the cache. Any function that uses an AVX2 instruction, and has
thus a measurable runtime diﬀerence observable over the network,
can be used as a transmit gadget. Even the leak gadget shown in
Listing 2 can act as a transmit gadget. By providing an in-bounds
value for x, the runtime of the function depends on the state of the
upper half of the AVX2 unit. If the upper half of the unit was used
before, i.e., a ‘1’-bit was leaked, the function executes faster than
if the upper half was not used before, i.e., a ‘0’-bit was leaked.
With these building blocks, we can build an AVX-based covert
channel. Our covert channel is the ﬁrst pure-AVX covert channel
NetSpectre Online, July 2018,
and the ﬁrst AVX-based remote covert channel. In our experiments
in a native local environment, we achieve a transmission rate of
125B/s with an error rate of 0.58%. In a local-area network, we
achieve a transmission rate of 8 B/min, with an error rate of <0.1%.
Since the true capacity of this remote covert channel is higher than
the true capacity of our remote cache covert channel, we can al-
ready see that it yields higher performance in our NetSpectre at-
tack.
5 ATTACK VARIANTS
In this section, we describe two NetSpectre attack variants. The
ﬁrst attack allows extracting secret data bit-by-bit from the mem-
ory of the target system. The second attacks allows defeating ASLR
on the remote machine, paving the way for remote exploitation of
bugs that ASLR would usually mitigate. We use gadgets based on
Spectre variant 1 for illustrative purposes but this can naturally be
done with any Spectre gadget that lies in a code path reached from
handling of a remote packet.
5.1 Extracting Data from the Target System
With typical NetSpectre gadgets (cf. Section 3), the extraction pro-
cess consists of 4 steps. Note that depending on the gadgets, the
leak gadget and transmit gadget might be the same.
(1) Mistrain the branch predictor.
(2) Reset the state of the microarchitectural element.
(3) Leak a bit to the microarchitectural element.
(4) Expose state of the microarchitectural element to the net-
work.
In step 1, the attacker mistrains the branch predictor of the vic-
tim to run a Spectre attack. To mistrain the branch predictor, the
attacker leverages the leak gadget with valid indices. The valid in-
dices ensure that the branch predictor learns to always take the
branch, i.e., the branch predictor speculates that the condition is
true. Note that this step only relies on the leak gadget. There is no
feedback to the attacker, and thus themicroarchitectural state does
not have to be reset or transmitted.
In step 2, the attacker has to reset the microarchitectural state
to enable the encoding of leaked bits using a microarchitectural
element. This step highly depends on the used microarchitectural
element, e.g., when leveraging the cache, the attacker downloads a
large ﬁle from the victim (cf. Figure 4), if AVX2 is used, the attacker
simply waits for more than 1ms. After this step, all requirements
are satisﬁed to leak a bit from the victim.
In step 3, the attacker exploits the Spectre vulnerability to leak
a single bit from the victim. As the branch predictor is mistrained
in step 1, providing an out-of-bounds index to the leak gadget will
run the in-bounds path and modify themicroarchitectural element,
i.e., the bit is encoded in the microarchitectural element.
In step 4, the attacker has to transmit the encoded information
via the network. This step corresponds to the second phase of the
original Spectre attack. In contrast to the original Spectre attack,
which leverages a cache attack, the attacker uses the transmit gad-
get for this step as described in Section 4. The attacker sends a
network packet which is handled by the transmit gadget and mea-
sures the time from sending the packet until the response arrives.
if (x < array_length)
access(array[x])
Listing 3: A NetSpectre gadget which can be leveraged to
break ASLR.
As described in Section 4, this round-trip time depends on the state
of the microarchitectural element, and thus on the leaked bit.
As the network latency varies, the four steps have to be repeated
multiple times to eliminate the noise caused by these ﬂuctuations.
Typically, the variance in latency follows a certain distribution de-
pending on multiple factors, such as distance, number of hops, net-
work congestion [14, 24, 34]. The number of repetitions depends
mainly on the variance in latency of the network connection. Thus,
depending on the latency distribution, the number of repetitions
can be deduced using statistical methods. In Section 6.1, we eval-
uate this attack variant and provide empirically determined num-
bers for our attack setup.
5.2 Remotely Breaking ASLR on the Target
System
If the attacker has no access to a bit-leaking NetSpectre gadgets,
it is possible to use a weaker NetSpectre gadget which does not
leak the actual data but only information about the corresponding
address. Such gadgets were not considered harmful for Spectre at-
tacks, which already have local code execution, as ASLR does not
protect against local attacks. However, in a remote scenario, it is
very valuable to break ASLR. If such a NetSpectre gadget is found
in a user-space program, it breaks ASLR for this process.
Listing 3 shows a simple leak gadget which is already suﬃcient
to break ASLR. With the help of this gadget, breaking ASLR con-
sists of 3 steps.
(1) Mistrain the branch predictor.
(2) Access an out-of-bounds index to cache a (known) memory
location.
(3) Measure the execution time of a function via the network
to deduce whether the out-of-bounds access cached a part
of it.
The mistraining step is the same as for any Spectre attack, lead-
ing to speculative out-of-bounds accesses relative to the array. If
the attacker provides an out-of-bounds value for x after mistrain-
ing, the array element at this index is speculatively accessed. As-
suming a byte array and an (unsigned) 64-bit index, an attacker
can (speculatively) access anymemory location, as the index wraps
around if the base address plus the index is larger than the virtual
memory. If the byte at this memory location is valid and cacheable,
it is cached after executing this gadget, as the speculative execution
will fetch the correspondingmemory location into the cache. Thus,
this gadget allows caching arbitrary memory locations which are
valid in the current virtual memory, i.e., every mapped memory
location of the current application.
The attacker uses this gadget to cache a memory location at a
known location, e.g., the vsyscall page which is mapped into every
application at the same virtual address [17]. The attacker thenmea-
sures the execution time of a function accessing the now cached
memory location, e.g., older versions of time or gettimeofday. If
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the function executes faster, the out-of-bounds array index actu-
ally cached a memory location used by this function. Thus, from
the known address and the value of the array index, i.e., the relative
oﬀset to the known address, the attacker can calculate the actual
address of the leak gadget.
With an ASLR entropy of 30 b on Linux [59], there are 230 pos-
sible oﬀsets the attacker has to check. Due to the KPTI (formerly
KAISER [27]) patches, no other page close to the vsyscall page is
mapped in the user space. Consequently, in the 230 possible oﬀsets,
there is only a single valid, and thus cacheable, oﬀset. Hence, we
can perform a binary search to ﬁnd the correct oﬀset, i.e., specu-
latively try to load half of the possible oﬀsets into the cache and
check a single time. If the single valid, and thus cacheable, oﬀset
was cached, the attacker chose the correct half, otherwise, the at-
tacker continues with the other half. This reduces the number of
checks to defeat ASLR to only 30.
Although vsyscall is a legacy feature, we found it to be still en-
abled onUbuntu 17.10 and Debian 9.4, the default operating system
for instances on the Google Cloud. Moreover, any other function
or data can be used instead of vsyscall if the address is known. If
the address of the leak gadget is known, it can also be repeated
to de-randomize any other function if the execution time of this
function can be measured via the network. If the attacker knows
a memory page at a ﬁxed oﬀset in the kernel, the same attack can
also be run on a NetSpectre gadget in the kernel to break KASLR.
6 EVALUATION
In this section, we evaluate NetSpectre and the performance of
our proof-of-concept implementation. Section 6.1 provides a qual-
itative evaluation and Section 6.2 a quantitative evaluation of our
NetSpectre attacks. For the evaluation we used laptops (Intel Core
i5-4200M, i5-6200U, i7-8550U), as well as desktop PCs (Intel Core
i7-6700K, i7-8700K), an unspeciﬁed Skylake-based Intel Xeon CPU
in the Google Cloud Platform, and an ARM Cortex A75.
6.1 Leakage
To evaluate NetSpectre on the diﬀerent devices, we constructed a
victim program which contains the same leak gadget and transmit
gadget on all test platforms (cf. Section 3). We leaked known val-
ues from the victim to verify that our attack was successful and to
determine how many measurements are necessary. Except for the
cloud setup, all evaluations were done in a local lab environment.
We used Spectre variant 1 for all evaluations, however, other Spec-
tre variants can be used in the same manner.
6.1.1 Desktop and Laptop Computers. In contrast to local Spec-
tre attacks, where a single measurement can already be suﬃcient,
NetSpectre attacks require a large number of measurements to dis-
tinguish bits with a certain conﬁdence. Even on a local network,
around 100 000 measurements are required to reduce the noise to a
level where a diﬀerence between bits can be clearly seen. By repeat-
ing the attack, the noise is reduced, making it easier to distinguish
the bits.
For our local attack we had a gigabit connection between the
victim and the attacker, a typical scenario in local networks but
also for network connections of dedicated servers and virtual
servers. We measured a standard deviation of the network latency
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Figure 7: Leaking the byte ‘d’ (01100100 in binary) bit by bit
using a NetSpectre attack. The maximum of the histograms
(green circle) can be separated using a simple threshold (red
line). If the maximum is left of the threshold, the bit is in-
terpreted as ‘1’, otherwise it is interpreted as ‘0’.
of 15.6 µs. Applying the three-sigma rule [70], in at least 88.8%
cases, the latency deviates ±46.8 µs from the average. This is nearly
3 orders of magnitude larger than the actual timing diﬀerence the
attacker wants to measure, explaining the large number of mea-
surements required.
Our proof-of-concept NetSpectre implementation leaks arbi-
trary bits from the victim by specifying an out-of-bounds index
of a memory bitstream. Figure 7 shows the leakage of one byte
using our proof-of-concept implementation. For every bit, we re-
peated the measurements 1 000 000 times. Although we only use a
naïve threshold on the maximum of the histograms, we can clearly
distinguish ‘0’-bits from ‘1’-bits. More sophisticated methods, e.g.,
machine learning approaches, might be able to further reduce the
number of measurements.
6.1.2 ARM Devices. Also in our evaluation on ARM devices we
used a wired network, as the network-latency varies too much in
today’s wireless connections. The ARM core we tested turned out
to have a signiﬁcantly higher variance in the network latency. We
measured a standard deviation of the network latency of 128.5 µs.
Again, with the three-sigma rule, we estimate that at least 88.8%
of the measurements are within ±385.5 µs.
Figure 8 shows two leaked bits—a ‘0’-bit and a ‘1’-bit—of an
ARM Cortex A75 victim. Even with the higher variance in la-
tency, simple thresholding allows separating the maxima of the
histograms. Hence, the attack also works on ARM devices.
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Figure 8: Histogram of the measurements for a ‘0’-bit and a
‘1’-bit on an ARM Cortex A75. Although the times for both
cases overlap, they are clearly distinguishable.
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Figure 9: Histogram of the measurements for a ‘0’-bit and a
‘1’-bit on two Google Cloud virtual machines with 20 000 000
measurements.
6.1.3 Cloud Instances. For the cloud instance, we tested our
proof-of-concept implementation on the Google Cloud Platform.
We created two virtual machine instances in the same region, one
as the attacker, one as the victim. For both instances, we used a
default Ubuntu 16.04.4 LTS as the operating system.
The measured standard deviation of the network latency was
52.3 µs. Thus, we estimate that at least 88.8% of the measurements
are in a range of ±156.9 µs. We veriﬁed that we can successfully
leak data by running a NetSpectre attack between the two in-
stances.
To adapt for the higher variance in network latency, we in-
creased the number of measurements by a factor of 20, i.e., every
bit was measured 20 000 000 times. Figure 9 shows a (smoothed)
histogram for both a ‘0’-bit and a ‘1’-bit on the Google Cloud in-
stances. Although there is still noise visible, it is possible to distin-
guish the bits and thus leak arbitrary bits from the victim cloud
instance.
6.2 NetSpectre Performance
To evaluate the performance of NetSpectre, we leaked known val-
ues from a target device. This allows us to not only determine how
fast an attacker can leak memory, but also to determine the bit-
error rate, i.e., how many bit errors to expect.
6.2.1 Local Network. Attacks on the local network achieve the
best performance, as the variance in network latency is signiﬁ-
cantly smaller than the variance over the internet (cf. Section 6.1.3).
In our lab setup, we repeat the measurement 1 000 000 times per bit
to be able to reliably leak bytes from the victim. On average, leak-
ing one byte takes 30min, which amounts to approximately 4min
per bit. Using the AVX covert channel instead of the cache reduces
the required time to leak an entire byte to only 8min.
To break ASLR, we require the cache covert channel. On aver-
age, this allows breaking the randomization remotely within 2 h.
We used stress -i 1 -d 1 for the experiments, to simulate
a realistic environment. Although we would have expected our at-
tack to work best on a completely idle server, we did not see any
negative eﬀects from the moderate server loads. In fact, they even
slightly improved the attack performance. One reason for this is
that a higher server load incurs a higher number of memory and
cache accesses [1] and thus facilitates the cache thrashing (cf. Sec-
tion 4), which is the performance bottle neck of our attack. An-
other reason is that a higher server load might exhaust execution
ports required to calculate the bounds check in the leak gadget,
thus increasing the chance that the CPU has to execute the condi-
tion speculatively.
Our NetSpectre attack in local networks is comparably slow.
However, in particular specialized malware attacks, e.g., APTs, are
often active over several months in local networks. Over such a
time frame, the attacker can indeed leak all data of interest from a
target system on the same network.
6.2.2 Cloud Network. We evaluated the performance in the
cloud using two virtual machines instances on the Google Cloud.
These virtual machines have a fast network connection. We conﬁg-
ured the two instances to each use 2 virtual CPUs, which enabled a
4Gbit/s connection [23]. In this setup, we repeat the measurement
20 000 000 times per bit to get an error-free leakage of bytes. On av-
erage, leaking one byte takes 8 h for the cache covert channel, and
3 h for the AVX covert channel.
While this is comparably slow, it shows that remote Spectre
attacks are feasible between independent instances in the pub-
lic cloud. In particular, APTs typically run for several weeks or
months. Such an extended time frame is clearly suﬃcient to leak
sensitive data, such as encryption keys or passwords, using the
NetSpectre attack in a cloud environment.
7 CHALLENGES OF MITIGATING SPECTRE
In this section, we discuss limitations of state-of-the-art counter-
measures against Spectre, and how they do not fully prevent Net-
Spectre attacks. Furthermore, we discuss how NetSpectre attacks
can be prevented on the network layer. Finally, we outline chal-
lenges for future research on Spectre attacks as well as Spectre
mitigations.
7.1 State-of-the-art Spectre Countermeasures
Due to the diﬀerent origins, Spectre variant 1 and variant 2 are mit-
igated using separate countermeasures. Intel released microcode
updates to prevent the cross-process and cross-privilege mistrain-
ing of indirect branches typical for Spectre variant 2 attacks.
There are no microcode updates to prevent mistraining of direct
branches, since this is easy to do in-place, i.e., in the same privilege
level and the same process context. For Spectre variant 1 attacks,
a series of pure software countermeasures have been proposed.
Intel and AMD recommend using the lfence instruction as a
speculation barrier [4, 40]. This instruction has to be inserted af-
ter security-critical bounds check to stop the speculative execution.
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However, adding this to every bounds check has a signiﬁcant per-
formance overhead [40].
Moreover, our experiments showed that lfences do stop the
speculative execution but not speculative code fetches and other
microarchitectural behaviors that occur pre-execution, such as
powering up of the AVX functional units, instruction cache ﬁlls,
and TLB ﬁlls. According to our experiments, lfences do work
against traditional Spectre gadgets but not against all Spectre gad-
gets we use in this paper, cf. Listing 2 and Listing 3, which can al-
ready leak information through microarchitectural behaviors that
occur pre-execution. However, we believe there are ways to use
lfences in a way that mitigates the leakage.
Microsoft implements an automatic detection of vulnerable
code paths, i.e., Spectre gadgets, in its compiler to limit the specu-
lation barrier to these gadgets [65]. However, Kocher [47] showed
that the automated analysis misses many gadgets. As Microsoft
only uses a blacklist for known gadgets [47], many gadgets, in par-
ticular gadgets which are not typical (e.g., gadgets to break ASLR),
are not automatically safeguarded by the compiler.
In the Linux kernel, exploitable gadgets are identiﬁed manually
and with the help of static code analyzers [52]. Similarly to the
compiler-based approach, this requires a complete understanding
of which code snippets are exploitable.
Finally, until now it was widely overlooked that indirect branch
mistraining (Spectre variant 2) is also possible in-place. However,
the attack possibilities are much more constrained with in-place
mistraining.
7.2 Network-layer Countermeasures
As NetSpectre is a network-based attack, it cannot only be pre-
vented by mitigating Spectre but also through countermeasures
on the network layer. A trivial NetSpectre attack can easily be de-
tected by a DDoS protection, as multiple thousand identical pack-
ets are sent from the same source. However, an attacker can choose
any trade-oﬀ between packets per second and leaked bits per sec-
ond. Thus, the speed atwhich bits are leaked can simply be reduced
below the threshold that the DDoS monitoring can detect. This is
true for any monitoring which tries to detect ongoing attacks, e.g.,
intrusion detection systems. Although the attack is theoretically
not prevented, at some point the attack becomes infeasible, as the
time required to leak a bit increases drastically.
Another method to mitigate NetSpectre is to add artiﬁcial noise
to the network latency. As the number of measurements depends
on the variance in network latency, additional noise requires an
attacker to perform more measurements. Thus, if the variance in
network latency is high enough, NetSpectre attacks become infea-
sible due to the large number of measurements required.
Both approaches may mitigate NetSpectre attacks in practice.
However, as attackers can adapt and improve attacks, it is not safe
to assume that noise levels and monitoring thresholds chosen now
will still be valid in the near future.
7.3 Future Research Challenges
As discussed in the previous sections, Spectre is far from being a
solved case. The currently proposed mitigations merely ﬁx symp-
toms without directly addressing the root cause, the imbalanced
trade-oﬀ between performance and security that led to the specu-
lative execution we currently have. We identiﬁed 5 challenges (C1
to C5) for future work on Spectre attacks and mitigations.
C1: Gadgets are more versatile than anticipated. In particular the
gadgets we use to break ASLR have not been considered dangerous
so far. Also the AVX-based gadgets we use were not considered so
far. Gadgets may also consist of many small code pieces that pass
on secret values until at a later point the secret value is leaked
to the attacker. Since the building block of Spectre that exﬁltrates
the information to the attacker is a covert channel, it appears the
underlying problem of identifying all gadgets may be reduced to
the problem of identifying all covert channels. Currently, we have
no technique to identify all covert channels in a system.
C2: Automatically safeguarding all gadgets is not trivial. For
Spectre variant 1 the proposed solution is to use speculation barri-
ers [4, 40]. As we cannot expect every developer to identify vulner-
able gadgets and correctly ﬁx them, state-of-the-art solutions try
to automatically detect vulnerable gadgets and ﬁx them at compile
time [65]. At the moment it is not clear whether static code anal-
ysis is suﬃcient to detect all vulnerable gadgets, especially if they
are scattered across functions. In such complex scenarios, dynamic
analysis might lead to better results. However, dynamic analysis
naturally suﬀers from incompleteness, as certain parts of the pro-
gram may not be reached in the dynamic analysis. Furthermore,
it might be possible that the compiler produces Spectre gadgets
which are not visible in the source code, as it can happen with e.g.,
double-fetch bugs [71]. This would hardly be detected upfront and
completely undermine the security measures taken.
C3: Blacklisting is inherently incomplete. Current approaches
rely on blacklists to automatically patch exploitable gadgets [65].
However, this implies that we understand exactly which code frag-
ments are exploitable and which are not. As this paper shows,
gadgets can look diﬀerent than anticipated, showing the incom-
pleteness of the blacklist approach. Inverting the logic might be
a better direction, i.e., using whitelists of (provably) unexploitable
gadgets instead of blacklists. However, this would require a sub-
stantial amount of research on proving non-exploitability of code
fragments.
C4: Cross-process and cross-privilege-level mistraining is easier to
solve than in-place mistraining. Current countermeasures mainly
aim at preventing Spectre attacks across process boundaries and
there especially across privilege levels [6, 40, 41]. However, as
shown in this paper, such countermeasures are ineﬀective if the
mistraining happens in-place inside the same process. Thismethod
is not only applicable to Spectre variant 1, but also to Spectre vari-
ant 2 [26]. Retpoline [77] is currently the only mitigation that pro-
tects against these Spectre variant 2 attacks by eﬀectively stopping
any further speculationby the processor.However, Retpoline is not
a perfect solution, as it incurs signiﬁcant performance overheads
and adds another side channel [21].
If an attacker can only poison branches with valid branch tar-
gets inside the same process, i.e., all microcode updates applied,
Retpoline can be replaced by a more simple construct we propose.
We propose to insert speculation barriers at every possible call tar-
get. This is a much clearer structure than with Retpolines. Thus,
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every misspeculated indirect call immediately aborts before actu-
ally executing code. For direct calls, the compiler can jump just
beyond the speculation barrier to have less performance impact.
Still, the overall performance impact of this solution, just like Ret-
poline, would be signiﬁcant. It remains unclear whether Spectre at-
tacks within the same process can be fully prevented without high
performance overheads and without introducing new problems.
C5: Security mechanisms may have unwanted side eﬀects. The
Retpoline patch basically hides the target of indirect calls from the
CPU by ﬁddling with the return values on the stack. However, this
leads to side eﬀects with other security mechanisms, as a Retpo-
line behaves similarly to an exploit changing the control ﬂow. Es-
pecially security mechanisms such as control-ﬂow integrity have
to be adapted [78] to not falsely detect Retpolines as attacks. Still,
the question arises how Spectre mitigations interact with other
CFI implementations, especially in hardware, as well as other secu-
rity mechanisms and whether we have to accept trade-oﬀs when
combining security mechanisms. In general, we need to investi-
gate which security mechanisms could have detrimental side ef-
fects that outweigh the gains in security.
8 CONCLUSION
In this paper, we presented NetSpectre, the ﬁrst remote Spectre
variant 1 attack. We demonstrated the ﬁrst access-driven remote
Evict+Reload cache attack over network, with a performance of 15
bits per hour. We also demonstrated the ﬁrst Spectre attack which
does not use a cache covert channel. In particular, in a remote Spec-
tre attack, our novel high-performance AVX-based covert channel
performs signiﬁcantly better than the remote cache covert channel.
Our NetSpectre attack in combination with the AVX-based covert
channel leaks 60 bits per hour from the target system. We veriﬁed
NetSpectre in local networks as well as in the Google cloud.
NetSpectre marks a paradigm shift for Spectre attacks, from lo-
cal attacks to remote attacks. With our NetSpectre attacks, a much
wider range and larger number of devices are exposed to Spectre
attacks. Spectre attacks now must also be considered on devices
which do not run any potentially attacker-controlled code at all.
We demonstrate that in a remote attack, NetSpectre can be used to
defeat address-space layout randomization on the remote system.
As we discussed in this paper, there are a series of open challenges
for future research on Spectre attacks and Spectre mitigations.
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